Enhancing Electromagnetic Covert Channels from Ethernet Cables for Data Exfiltration

Abstract

Abstract In an era of rapid digitization, safeguarding data security is more crucial than ever. While advancements in technology enhance our capabilities, they also introduce new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers seeking to breach security measures. Despite significant progress in conventional security protocols, a common shortcoming is the insufficient focus on unconventional data channels, which often remain vulnerable to exploitation. Addressing these gaps is essential to creating a comprehensive security framework that protects against all potential threats. Covert channels represent a class of data channels that exploit unconventional means to extract data from protected sources. These channels leverage sources of data unintentionally exposed to the outside world, overcoming standard security measures. One such covert channel is the electromagnetic emission generated by Ethernet data cables during data transmission. While numerous studies have explored electromagnetic Ethernet covert channels, their limited practical applicability and lack of generalizability have reduced their overall significance. This study aims to address these issues by identifying areas for improvement and investigating the primary factors influencing generalizability. Through a formal analysis, it evaluates elements that affect the effectiveness of these covert channels. The research concludes with a simulation of both the attacker’s and victim’s setups to assess the impact of the proposed enhancements on covert communication methods. ii